#3772 NASA Boeing CST-100 Software Hazard Reports, Supported Safety Queries
#3772 NASA Boeing CST-100 Software Hazard Reports, Supported Safety Queries
#3772 I have a CSV file with 25 software hazard reports including report name, description, hazard causes, hazard controls and hazard control verifications for Boeing CST-100 Starliner-1 (SL-1). This data will be imported into a knowledge graph for SL-1. List and describe 15 safety queries that should be supported by this knowledge graph, and what would be required to support each query.
Of course. A knowledge graph is an excellent way to represent and analyze complex safety-critical data. Here are 15 safety queries that a knowledge graph built from your software hazard reports should support, along with the requirements for each.
Foundational Queries
These queries focus on direct data retrieval and understanding the basic relationships within the hazard data.
1. What are the causes of a specific hazard?
Description: For a given hazard report, this query retrieves all the documented causes. This is fundamental for understanding why a hazard exists.
Requirements:
Nodes for
Hazard Report
andHazard Cause
.A relationship, such as
hasCause
, connecting aHazard Report
to itsHazard Cause
nodes.
2. What controls are in place for a specific hazard?
Description: This query lists all the safety measures or design features implemented to mitigate a particular hazard.
Requirements:
Nodes for
Hazard Report
andHazard Control
.A relationship, like
isControlledBy
, linking aHazard Report
to itsHazard Control
nodes.
3. How is a specific hazard control verified?
Description: This query identifies the test, analysis, or inspection method used to ensure a hazard control is correctly implemented and effective.
Requirements:
Nodes for
Hazard Control
andHazard Control Verification
.A relationship, such as
isVerifiedBy
, connecting aHazard Control
to itsHazard Control Verification
nodes.
4. Display the full "safety chain" for a hazard.
Description: This query provides a complete, end-to-end view of a single hazard, tracing the path from its causes to its controls and their respective verifications.
Requirements:
A clear and queryable path through the graph:
Hazard Cause
→Hazard Report
→Hazard Control
→Hazard Control Verification
.
Queries for Identifying Gaps and Weaknesses
These queries are designed to proactively find potential vulnerabilities in the safety plan.
5. Are there any hazard controls without a verification method?
Description: This is a critical gap-analysis query that flags any safety control that hasn't been proven effective through a verification procedure.
Requirements: The ability to find all
Hazard Control
nodes that are missing an outgoingisVerifiedBy
relationship.
6. Which hazards are mitigated by only a single control?
Description: This query identifies potential single-point failures in the safety design. Hazards with only one control might lack sufficient redundancy.
Requirements: The ability to count the number of outgoing
isControlledBy
relationships for eachHazard Report
node and filter for those with a count of one.
7. Which hazard causes are not addressed by any controls?
Description: This query looks for causes that have been identified but are not explicitly mitigated by a documented control in any hazard report they contribute to.
Requirements: A more complex query that checks if a
Hazard Cause
is linked to aHazard Report
that lacks anyisControlledBy
relationships.
Queries for Analyzing Inter-relationships and Commonalities
These queries leverage the graph's ability to show complex connections and common patterns across the dataset.
8. Are there any "common cause" hazards?
Description: This query finds a single cause that contributes to multiple, different hazards. Identifying these is crucial as a single failure event could trigger several hazardous conditions.
Requirements:
Hazard Cause
entities that are treated as unique nodes.The ability to find
Hazard Cause
nodes with incominghasCause
relationships from more than oneHazard Report
node.
9. Are there any "common controls" used for multiple hazards?
Description: This query identifies controls that are used to mitigate more than one hazard. This can reveal highly critical controls whose failure could have wide-ranging consequences.
Requirements:
Hazard Control
entities modeled as unique nodes.The ability to find
Hazard Control
nodes with incomingisControlledBy
relationships from multipleHazard Report
nodes.
10. What other hazards are affected if a specific control fails?
Description: A "what-if" impact analysis query. It simulates the failure of a control and returns all the hazards that would no longer be mitigated.
Requirements: The ability to traverse the graph from a
Hazard Control
node back to all connectedHazard Report
nodes.
Advanced and Inferential Queries
These queries require more data, such as information extracted from text descriptions, to provide deeper insights.
11. Which hazards are related to a specific software component (e.g., "Flight Control Module")?
Description: This query connects abstract hazards to concrete hardware or software components. This is essential for assigning responsibility and focusing debugging efforts.
Requirements:
Introduction of a new node type:
Software Component
.Relationships, like
affects
, linkingHazard Report
orHazard Cause
nodes toSoftware Component
nodes. This would likely require NLP to extract component names from thedescription
text or manual data enrichment.
12. Which hazard reports mention "timing," "latency," or "synchronization"?
Description: This allows for thematic searches across the hazard database, helping to identify systemic issues that might not be obvious from report titles alone.
Requirements:
The
description
andhazard causes
text must be stored as properties on theHazard Report
andHazard Cause
nodes.The knowledge graph's query language must support full-text search on these properties.
13. What is the most common type of hazard control?
Description: This query helps in understanding the overall safety strategy. For example, it could reveal if the system relies more on preventative measures, error detection, or fault tolerance.
Requirements:
A classification or "typing" of
Hazard Control
nodes (e.g., "Redundancy," "Logic Check," "Recovery Mechanism").This would likely require manual classification or a sophisticated NLP model to categorize the controls based on their descriptions.
14. If a verification test fails, what software components are impacted?
Description: This is a reverse-traceability query. It helps engineers quickly understand the full scope of a failed test, from the specific control to all the hazards and components it affects.
Requirements: The ability to perform a multi-step traversal: from
Hazard Control Verification
→Hazard Control
→Hazard Report
→Software Component
. This again relies on the existence ofSoftware Component
nodes.
15. Show me all hazards that are not verified by a specific type of test (e.g., "Integration Test").
Description: This query helps ensure that the verification strategy is diverse and robust, preventing over-reliance on a single type of testing.
Requirements:
A classification system for
Hazard Control Verification
nodes (e.g., "Unit Test," "Integration Test," "Analysis," "Inspection").A query that can filter
Hazard Report
nodes based on the properties of their connectedHazard Control Verification
nodes.
From <https://gemini.google.com/app/> Google Gemini 2.5 Pro
Comments
Post a Comment